In Re: NewStarcom Holdings Inc by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-16-2020 
In Re: NewStarcom Holdings Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: NewStarcom Holdings Inc" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 675. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/675 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  NEWSTARCOM HOLDINGS INC., et al., 
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District Judge: The Honorable Maryellen Noreika 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2020 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 






  OPINION* 
_____________________                             
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
Bankruptcy trustee George L. Miller challenges the dismissal of his 
fraudulent transfer claims and the denial of reconsideration.  Seeing no error, we 
will affirm. 
I1 
Shortly after a complex transaction, NSC Holdings, Inc. (“NSC”) and three 
associated entities filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.2  Their Trustee brought 
this adversary proceeding against another entity implicated in the transaction, 
Matco Electric Corp. (“New Matco”), and its owners (collectively, “New Matco 
Defendants”),3 among others.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Because we write solely for the parties, we summarize only the facts and 
proceedings necessary to this disposition.   
2 The other three entities were NSC’s sole shareholder, NewStarcom Holdings, 
Inc., and NSC’s two defunct subsidiaries, Constar International, Inc. and Port City 
Electric, Inc.  Collectively, these four entities are referred to as the “Debtors” or 
“NewStarcom.”   
3 New Matco’s owners were Ronald Barber, Mark Freije, and Kenneth Elliott.  




The Amended Complaint challenged “the prepetition transfer of 
NewStarcom’s operating subsidiary Matco Electric Corporation [“Old Matco”] to 
insiders for substantially less than its fair market value.”  J.A. 159.  The Trustee 
labeled the transaction a fraudulent transfer voidable under federal bankruptcy law 
and Delaware state law.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, 
§§ 1304, 1305.  He sought recovery of the transfer.  See 11 U.S.C. § 550. 
The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the four fraudulent transfer–related counts 
for failure to state a claim.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
Years later, the Trustee sought reconsideration, but the Bankruptcy Court denied 
his motion.  In re NewStarcom Holdings, Inc., 547 B.R. 106, 132–35 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2016).  On appeal, the District Court affirmed both orders.4  608 B.R. 614 (D. 
Del. 2019). 
 
4 “Congress authorized bankruptcy courts to exercise jurisdiction based on referral 
from the district court.”  In re Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC, 941 F.3d 64, 
71 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)); see also § 1334(b) (district court 
jurisdiction not exclusive).  Due to the District Court’s standing referral in 
bankruptcy matters, the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction in this case over “core 
proceedings,” including the Trustee’s “proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover 
fraudulent conveyances.”  § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(H); see also In re Healthcare Real 
Estate Partners, LLC, 941 F.3d at 70; U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Delaware, Am. 
Standing Order of Reference (Feb. 29, 2012).  The District Court had appellate 





“The purpose of fraudulent conveyance law is to make available to creditors 
those assets of the debtor that are rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if 
they have been transferred away.”  Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 2000). 
We consider whether the Trustee pled “enough facts” to make his fraudulent 
transfer claims “plausible on [their] face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007).   Our traditional three steps entail (1) “not[ing] the elements of a 
claim,” (2) “identify[ing] allegations that are conclusory and therefore not assumed 
to be true,” and (3) “accepting the factual allegations as true, we will view them 
and reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to [the 
Trustee] to decide whether ‘they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”  
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 326 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Connelly v. Lane 
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016)), cert. denied, No. 19-784 (Mar. 
30, 2020).  
We home in on one element underpinning all of the Trustee’s fraudulent 
 
5 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.  Our review of 
the District Court’s appellate ruling is de novo.  In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 227 
(3d Cir. 2006).  We take the same approach to the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of 




transfer claims: the role of a debtor.  Under federal bankruptcy law, a trustee “may 
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor” or “an interest of the debtor in 
property” in certain circumstances.6  11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 548(a)(1).  The 
analogous provisions of the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(“DUFTA”) are similarly confined to “[a] transfer made . . . by a debtor.”  Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1304(a), 1305(a); see also § 1305(b).   
Fraudulent transfer liability under DUFTA does not attach to a transfer by a 
non-debtor.  Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venez., S.A., 879 F.3d 79, 81, 
84–86 (3d Cir. 2018) (predicting Delaware Supreme Court’s view in diversity 
case).  By extension, federal bankruptcy law does not impose liability for transfers 
of non-debtor property.  See id. at 86 (deeming federal § 548 to be “nearly 
identical” with Delaware provisions including §§ 1304–05, and indicating 
“Delaware courts have interpreted and applied them uniformly”). 
The Trustee ostensibly alleged a transfer of property of debtors, by debtors.  
For example, the Amended Complaint states that “[t]he Transfer was a transfer of 
property, or of an interest in property, of the Debtors,” and that “[t]he Debtors 
made the Transfer to and/or for the benefit of the New Matco Defendants.”  J.A. 
 
6 Only if a trustee avoids a fraudulent transfer under federal bankruptcy provisions 
such as §§ 544 and 548 may he pursue recovery under § 550.  Accordingly, the 
plausibility of the Trustee’s § 550 claim depends on the “debtor” element of his 




181.  These allegations virtually parrot the debtor element of federal bankruptcy 
and DUFTA provisions.  “[M]ere conclusory statements” like these are not entitled 
to the presumption of truth.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
Peeling away the conclusions, we look for well-pleaded factual allegations.  
The Amended Complaint defines the “Transfer” at issue as the “transfer of Old 
Matco to the New Matco Defendants.”  J.A. 180.  The Trustee asserted that “New 
Matco, owned by Defendants Barber, Elliott, and Freije, purchased Old Matco” 
through an Asset Purchase Agreement and Membership Interest Purchase 
Agreement.  J.A. 172.  These agreements are both attached to the Amended 
Complaint.  They show that Old Matco was the transferor in those portions of the 
transaction.7  And Old Matco is a non-debtor. 
Evidently another part of the transaction involved a transfer of the property 
of a debtor, by a debtor.  The record shows that debtor NSC owned 100% of the 
shares of Old Matco and conveyed them to a third party using a Stock Purchase 
Agreement.  But the Trustee failed to plead that part of the transaction.  
The Trustee’s non-conclusory allegations fail to plausibly establish his 
 
7 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an 
exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); ALA, Inc. v. 
CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Where there is a disparity 
between a written instrument annexed to a pleading and an allegation in the 




entitlement to relief under the fraudulent transfer provisions of federal bankruptcy 
law or DUFTA.  So the Bankruptcy Court rightly dismissed the fraudulent transfer 
claims.8 
III 
The District Court correctly affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of 
the fraudulent transfer claims.  Accordingly, we also will affirm. 
 
8 Although we need not reach the motion for reconsideration, we are unpersuaded 
that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by denying that motion.  See In re 
Energy Future Holdings Corp., 904 F.3d 298, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied 
sub nom., NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Elliott Assocs., L.P., 139 S. Ct. 1620 (2019) 
(Mem.).   
 
